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COURT ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES TO MEET
THE NEEDS OF MODERN SOCIETY
JUDGE DAVID W.

PECKt

The Dimensions of Justice
Justice is usually thought of in the terms of the rightness of result
reached in the individual case. This is the proper measure of justice
on a single plane of one dimension.
But there are other dimensions of justice. There is a dimension in
time. Was the judgment timely rendered?
There is a dimension in economics. What did it cost to get the judgment? What did it cost the plaintiff-the defendant-the public?
There is a fourth dimension. It is the total effectiveness of the
system of administering justice-the total effect of court organization
and procedures on the mass of litigation.
We may take just pride in a system of jurisprudence which affords
a fair trial under objective law with ample safeguards of recognized
rights. But we must still answer to the question-Is the system efficacious in according each case a prompt consideration and disposition by
procedures which are economical in the expenditure of lawyers' time and
clients' money?
Unfortunately today, the answer would have to be that justice is
long delayed in many places, that courts are not efficiently organized,
and that the procedures employed are so wasteful of professional time
that lawyers have to go underpaid unless clients are to be overcharged.
While inordinate delays in reaching cases for trial-ranging from
eighteen months to four years in centers of population-is a city phenomenon and primarly a city problem, the city does not have to reach
giant size to experience it. Some medium and smaller sized cities are
encountering serious delay. And procedural waste is common to court
practice the country over.
The administration of justice is not a business in the sense of marketing the machine made and mass produced. But it is a business in the
very real sense of being affected in the quality, quantity, cost and delivery
of its product by the same factors which make any business a success or
failure. Functional efficiency of organization, competency and indust Presiding Justice in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the First
Judicial Department of the State of New York.
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try of* personnel, economy and productivity of processes, play the same
part in court operations as in business operations.
-The priceless ingredient in the judicial product is the individual
touch of lawyer and judge, the conscientious discharge of a personal
responsibility on the part of the lawyer who presents a case and on the
part of the judge who decides it. There is no substitute for that professional and personal care which is the core of justice. We lawyers
must not diminish or dilute that professional quality. But it does behoove us to frame a court system and fashion the procedures on a sound
business basis, which will allow needed professional services to be rendered in a time and at a cost which will effect complete justice.
Court Organization
The organization of the court system may appropriately vary in
different places according to the-size of the community and the nature
and volume of its litigation. The needs of metropolitan centers are different from the 'needs of less populated areas. Generally it can be'said,
however, that court systems have become over complicated and compartmentalized and that there is a basic need for simplification of court
structures.
The historic practice, particularly in the large cities, has been to splinter and parcel out fields of jurisdiction among many courts of limited
jurisdiction. The trend for a century has been to create rather than
consolidate courts, to narrow rather than broader jurisdiction, to divide
rather than concentrate administrative authority. The result, in many
places, is a conglomeration of courts, each autonomous in administration,
confined but overlapping in jurisdiction.
In many cities administration of the criminal law has been separated
from administration of the civil law. Separate courts have been created
for probate and estate proceedings and for domestic relations. There has
even been an elaborate stratification of courts in the same legal line.
New York City, for example, has three layers of courts in both the civil
and criminal lines. The civil courts are divided by monetary limits.
The criminal courts are divided by degrees of crime.
Such a fragmented court organization, without flexibility in moving judges and -cases about to achieve balance in distribution, and without centralization of administrative authority, lacks the elementary essentials of a court system. It is not a court system.
It is not the purpose of this lecture to blueprint a court system for
any community: But in outline the specifications of a sound court system can be stated. Although specialties exist in court work and a dif-
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ferentiation can appropriately be made in the handling of cases depending on the dollar amount or degree of crime involved, still a lot of specialized and stratified courts are unnecessary and undesirable. To the
extent that specialization of judges is desirable, it can be accomplished
more satisfactorily by establishing divisions and assigning judges within
a court than by creating specialized courts.
There should be no more than two trial courts in any community,
with the possible addition of a family court.
There is no sound basis for the separation of civil and criminal
jurisdictions. Any idea that judges become more expert or do a better
job by being confined to civil or criminal work is a false notion. Indeed,
confining a judge to criminal cases is dulling and even warping. With
rare exceptions, a good judge will be equally good at any kind of judicial
work, and be the better for the broader experience. If aptitudes are
limited or concentration desirable, the assigning authority can readily
make the indicated assignments. The federal courts throughout their
history have successfully operated by combining in one court and spreading among all judges civil, criminal, admiralty and patent work.
In populous centers with a large volume of litigation there is virtue
in a two-tier court system-a high court for felony cases and civil cases
of relatively large importance, and a general court for lesser criminal
cases and civil cases of lower monetary value.
The obvious advantage in a simple court structure, aside from operational economy, is flexibility in deployment of the judicial working force.
Multiplication of court units with separate judicial complements results
in freezing and wasting judicial manpower. It does not allow the movement of judicial personnel to adjust to shifting caseloads or changing
needs. Aptitude of a judge for particular work cannot be recognized or
employed because his ambit is dictated and limited by the fixed jurisdiction of the court to which he is attached.
A unified court system of one or two courts of general jurisdiction
permits the assignment of judges according to individual qualifications
and overall needs. As one branch or another of the court requires more
or less judicial attention, the adjustment can be made momentarily.
Fewer judges are required to man the positions because of their maneuverability. Desirable rotation of judges in the divisions of the court is
made possible as well as a practical recognition of aptitudes in
assignments.
Administrative Authority
The necessary corollary to a unified court system is central administrative authority exercising overall management. The fact that
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judicial work is highly individual in nature does not militate against
the need or value of managerial offices. A court is more than a collection of individual judges. It has a corporate responsibility for the care
of all cases, to see that calendar arrangements, case administration and
judicial assignments are devised to give adequate and timely attention to
each case. Where the judicial function is divided between several courts,
it is doubly important to have unity of administration. Someone or
some group must be charged with the broad responsibility of appraising
needs for judicial services, making assignments to meet the needs, adopting court rules, making up the budget and overseeing the clerical force,
to the end that courts and judges will function together systematically
and discharge their institutional duty.
In states of compact territory or light population, the Supreme Court
is the natural seat of administrative authority over the whole court system. In the larger or heavily populated states, the Supreme Court may
be too remote or too fully occupied with its own judicial work to have
the contacts or time to administer a state-wide court system. Intermediate appellate courts on a sectional basis, like the Appellate Divisions
of the New York Supreme Court, may be the best bodies to exercise
administrative authority over the courts in their sections of the state.
Or where a single trial court of general jurisdiction exists throughout
a state, as in Massachusetts, administrative authority over that court may
appropriately be vested in the Chief Judge. Metropolitan courts may be
so distinctive in their problems and such complete and contained operations on their own as to make them a natural administrative unit.
The pattern of court organization and administration need not be
the same everywhere. But the principles are the same. Whether by
state, section or community, whichever makes a natural unit of manageable proportions, the courts should be integrated and under unitary administration of a single judge or appellate court.
Court Procedures
Equal in importance with court organization are court procedures,
and the need of revamping court procedures in this country is as urgent
as the need for structural reorganization of the courts. In a word, the
need is for greatly simplified procedure, more economical and expeditious
than prevailing practices.
While procedures prior to trial present a somewhat different problem from the trial process itself, and this part of the lecture will deal
with the former, leaving the latter for later consideration, the two do go
together and jointly account for the delays and expense which place such
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a heavy burden on litigation. For the moment, therefore, and for the
sake of perspective, before making any analysis of either the procedures
prior to trial or the trial process, I am going to invite you to take a short
look backward and perceive the effect to date, on both the public and
the profession, of the procedural rigmarole and the slow and cumbersome trial process. The future consequence, to the public and the profession, of perpetuating prevailing methods, can be foreseen with equal
clarity and certainty.
Until the late 1920's the courts were principally occupied with commercial litigation. Trial lawyers enjoyed a rounded practice with a
variety of commercial matters. Today commercial litigation has all but
left the courts and the courts have been reduced to the principal occupation of personal injury litigation. Businessmen have found court procedures too dilatory and costly to serve their need for an expeditious and
economical medium for resolving commercial controversies, and they
have gone elsewhere for satisfaction of their demands.
Of this, the legal profession had fair warning, as it now has ample
warning of a similar threat to the litigation which remains. As early
as 1902 the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York petitioned
the state legislature for the appointment of a commission to study the
law's delays and the cost of litigation, to the end that the courts might be
better organized and procedure better adapted to the prompt and economical consideration and disposition of cases. The commission was
appointed. Its report was filed. Its recommendations were ignored.
The business community waited another quarter of a century for relief.
Then both disappointed and disgusted, businessmen engaged in self help
and created their own tribunals and procedures for handling commercial
cases. Now sixty trade associations in this country maintain arbitration
tribunals which handle most of the commercial cases, without the benefit
of law and largely without the benefit of lawyers.
It is not within the scope of this lecture to comment on the virtues
or vices of arbitration. The point is that arbitration came into being
and has expanded in use as a revulsion against the complications, delays
and costs of court processes. We of the legal profession may be justly
proud of our governing law, the court concept and the judicial process.
We have something of value to offer the business community. Many
businessmen recognize and appreciate that value. But they will not return to the courts or to trial lawyers unless and until we modernize our
methods.
The lesson to be learned from arbitration is that suitors seek simplicity and economy of procedure, expertise in the consideration and ex-
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pedition in the disposition of cases. To regain lost ground, indeed to retain the ground now held, the profession must introduce into the court
frame the attractions and advantages of arbitration, all of which can be
provided consistently with the maintenance of sound court standards.
Let us make no mistake about it, the same practices which have
driven commercial litigation from the courts operate adversely on the litigation which remains and threaten similarly to drive it from the courts
and the profession. Inordinate delays, cumbersome procedure, and excessive costs in handling personal injury cases justify the growing agitation for a compensation system, akin to workmen's compensation, for
automobile accidents, the source of about half the litigation in the courts
today. Indeed, it is a safe prediction that unless court procedures are
reformed to remove delays and reduce expenses, automobile injury cases
will go to compensation as commercial cases have gone to arbitration.
Time here does not permit anything like a complete consideration of
procedures prior to trial and of the possibilities of eliminating or compacting some of them. But if we dwell for a moment on the pleading
process alone we will have a sufficient example of what is wrong and
an indication of the direction in which we must move to right it.
A proper complaint and answer would bring a case to issue without
pleading elaboration or correction. But it is a rare case in which the issues get defined in a complaint and answer. The pleadings are apt to be
a mere formality, an opening gambit, calculated to say too little or too
much, necessitating amplification, clarification or simplification by motions for bills of particulars, motions to make the pleadings more definite
and certain, to separately state causes of action, or to strike allegations
as irrelevant. Even in the simplest accident case, the pleadings are usually a meaningless formality of stereotyped allegations and denials,
neither revealing nor conceding enough, entailing rounds of exhaustive
shadow boxing before realistic contact is made. The list of motions and
cross-motions which are idled through in quite ordinary lawsuits dooms
many from the start to delay and expense which impair or destroy the
value of the right to prosecute or defend.
Actually, not even a complaint and answer are necessary. Lawyers
could as easily and more effectively confer and agree on a statement of
claims, defenses and issues. The New York Civil Practice Act now provides for such a submission of a controversy without pleadings. A single
statement subscribed by the attorneys is accepted in lieu of pleadings.
I suggest that the way lawyers should proceed is to confer as a matter of course as soon as a claim is made. If they cannot adjust the matter without litigation, they should set forth their differences in precise
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terms after adequate disclosure and discussion of their positions. The
time so spent in personal contact will be much more productive than the
formal and usually fruitless tilting and jousting with pleadings and
motions.
Frankly, the answer to the procedural perplexity is in the attitude
and action of lawyers, their frame of mind and habits of practice, rather
than in any code which might be devised. Simplified procedure must begin with the willingness of lawyers to forego and give up delaying maneuvers and harassing tactics.
Perhaps it is too idealistic to hope that pettifoggery and cold war
tactics will be eliminated from trial practice. But vogues can change and
a few leaders of the Bar could set a pattern which others would follow.
If through the experience of experiment lawyers could once see what
was to be gained and saved by directly coming to grips with a case, shortcircuiting the procedural routine and dropping the shadow boxing, they
would develop habits that would make dilatory procedural maneuvers a
dead letter rather than a dead load on litigation.
It may be that most of the present procedural provisions are necessary in the sense that they should be available if a case will not get in
shape for trial without exhaustive procedural efforts. But the rulemaking authority can provide permissive means of bringing a case to issue without pleadings, and should provide certain sanctions which judges
may impose for procedural abuses. For example, meaningful costs
should be imposed if a party so conducts litigation as to necessitate the
other party's making a motion which would not have been necessary if
proper procedure had been followed in the first place. Similarly, punitive costs should be imposed if a party makes an unwarranted motion.
Codes of procedure should generally allow applications, which are usually
made by motions addressed to the court, to be made by requests addressed
to the other party, and such requests should precede the making of any
motion for the relief requested. If a motion follows, substantial costs
should be assessed against the party at fault in making the motion or in
requiring it to be made.
But elaborate rules and adequate sanctions will not be nearly as salutary as the common adoption and acceptance by the Bar of sound practices as a matter of course. A conscientiously implemented resolve to
simplify procedure would pay large dividends in time saved, smoother
professional relations and economies mutually beneficial to client and
lawyer. It would also go far to remove the psychological barrier which
now separates many a prospective client and his case from a lawyer and
the court.
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The Trial
The actual trial, when conducted by a judge without a jury, is usually as expeditious and to the point as could be asked. Most trials, however, are before juries and the jury process is inherently slow. Every
phase of a jury trial, being geared to the assimilation of the unfamiliar
by the inexpert, is much slower than a trial before a judge alone. Not
only are there time consuming features of a jury trial wholly absent or
substantially abridged in a trial before a judge-such as the selection of
the jury, opening statement, summation and charge-but the whole conduct of a jury trial is greatly elaborated and extended in the questioning
of witnesses, objections, rulings and by-play. In all, it takes two and
a half times as long to try a case before a jury as before a judge.
It is not within the scope of this lecture to discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of the jury system or to appraise the place of the
jury in a modern court system. Concededly the jury is of such value in
serious criminal cases that no one would suggest giving it up, although
the trend is to confine the use of juries in criminal cases to crimes of
felony degree and to submit lesser charges to a judge or banc of judges.
In any event, the number of criminal cases which are tried in any community is not so great as to constitute a drag on court tinie or prevent
prompt trials.
In the civil area, particularly the class of cases which constitute the
bulk of work in the courts, personal injury cases, the use of the jury
does delay trials and is principally responsible for the trial delay which
exists in American cities. The jury process is the bottleneck in the case
line. The slowness of the process, administered by a limited number of
judges and applied to a large number of cases, operates to back cases up
in a long line awaiting their turn at the bottleneck. The delay in reaching cases for trial also operates to postpone the ultimate settlements which
are made, so that all cases, whether tried or settled, are held up and
prejudiced by the inability of the courts to digest and keep up with the
caseload while employing existing facilities and procedures.
I happen to think that all interests would be better served by some
qualification of the right to a jury trial in civil cases in congested communities. In personal injury cases I would complement the avoidance
of juries with the abolition of the rule of contributory negligence and
substitution o'f a rule of comparative negligence. In my view, the consideration and decision of these cases by a judge under a rule of comparative negligence would be the closest approximation to justice we
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could get, and it would be accompanied by prompt hearings and dispositions, with an enormous saving of time and expense.
But recognizing the arguments in favor of a jury, even in civil
cases, and conscious of the still prevailing sentiment in favor of jury
trials, I do not make my own preference for non-jury trials a keystone
in the arch of a contemplated court system. Realism compels the conclusion, however, that delays will be eliminated and prompt trials had in
centers of population only through some qualification of the right to a
jury trial, substantially reducing the number of such trials, or by a vast
increase in court plant and facilities, the number of judges and calls
upon the citizenry for jury duty.
The PretrialConference
The overloading of present court facilities committed to employing
prevailing court processes, with the consequent roadblocks and delays,
makes it imperative to seek means of relieving the congestion by avoiding the trial route. The compelling need is for an alternative or substitute for the full trial course, a short-cut, a simple, quick and inexpensive
method of determining cases--one which, although it may not be foisted
on parties instead of according them the right of trial, is regularly avaitable and employable in advance of trial, without prejudicing a subsequent
trial, and is generally adequate to effect an accord and save the labor and
cost of a trial.
The professional procedure admirably suited to this purpose is the
pretrial conference, an informal but professional survey of a case by a
judge and the two lawyers sometime before the case would be reached
for trial. They can come to grips with a case, go to the heart of it, and
make an accurate appraisal of its merits and value in fairly short order.
Combining the expertness, experience and judgment of court and counsel, these three co-professionals are more likely to reach a fairer and
sounder conclusion in short time than a jury of laymen would come to
after the long process of trial.
The immense value of the pretrial conference as a method of settling
cases, avoiding trials and relieving congestion has been demonstrated
wherever it has been earnestly employed. It would be fair to say that
without pretrial conferences the administration of justice would have
broken down in some localities. I know that is true in the City of New
York. The dispositions effected by pretrial conferences have literally
saved the court system.
It is not generally realized how few cases and what a small proportion of the cases are actually tried to completion. Of the thousands of
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cases entering metropolitan courts each year, only a few hundred are
tried to a decision. Over 90% are settled. If this were not so the delay
in reaching cases for trial would be much greater than the current figures
of two, three and four years. Metropolitan courts, surfeited with accident cases, simply cannot handle them by traditional trial methods with
anything like the present number of judges and jurors. An abridged
procedure is absolutely essential and the pretrial conference fills the
need. That is, it fills the need if properly conducted. Merely calling a
pretrial conference or calling it a pretrial conference will count for little.
The efficacy of the conference is dependent upon the serious purpose and
good faith efforts of the lawyers, and the application and good sense of
the judge.
There is so much misunderstanding and difference of opinion as to
the proper function and purpose of the pretrial conference that clarification of the meaning and scope of "pretrial" is called for. "Pretrial" may
range in scope from a perfunctory inquiry into the possibility of settling
a case, the merest surface consideration of a case, resulting in a disposition only when the case is obviously ripe for settlement, to an elaborate
parsing of issues and attempt to narrow the issues by formal admissions.
In between is a less formal approach but serious exploration of a case
directed at effecting a final disposition.
There is a school of pretrialers who think of pretrial primarily as a
means of simplifying or reducing issues, putting a case in neater shape
for trial, thereby reducing trial time. To them, settlement of a case may
be a fortunate incident or by-product of the conference, but it is not regarded as the objective of the proceeding. Another school regards settlement as the sole objective and any tangental attention to a case a waste
of time.
It is my conclusion that each approach, or perhaps a combination,
has its virtue and value, depending on the nature of the case. The procedure should be flexible. Instead of being cast in a set form or following a fixed formula, the conference should be adapted to the case at hand
and the indicated possibilities for fruitful exploration after an initial look
at the case. Disposition should be frankly sought, but if that proves
impossible any possibility of simplifying or reducing issues should be
pursued. The complicated cases are more difficult to settle but lend
themselves to a sharpening of issues. The run of cases, such as the
ordinary personal injury actions, do not require or warrant a formal
refining of issues, but do offer a promising possibility of settlement by
going directly to that objective. The experienced judge with intuition
and insight can quite quickly perceive the promsie in proceeding one way
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or another and will conduct the conference in a manner best calculated
to realize its potential.
It is no minimization of the role of the lawyers in a pretrial conference to say that the success of the conference is principally dependent
upon the perception and diligence of the judge. The lawyers will usually
respond to his attitude and good offices. His part in the conference is
the most arduous of judicial labors. It is quite a different role and one
much more exacting than presiding over a jury trial and simply ruling
on evidence and charging the jury. The judge who fully performs his
part in a pretrial conference must bestir himself to grasp the case and to
concentrate the attention of both himself and the lawyers in a fair consideration of the case. His incisiveness, patience, persistence and good
judgment are crucial contributions to the conference. He may not fancy
the role, but the judicial function thus well performed is more productive than many times the same amount of time put in a formal presiding
over jury trials.
The use of the pretrial procedure here outlined will go a long way
toward effecting justice and reducing the court caseload to manageable
proportions. Perhaps in this way we can even preserve the right to a jury
trial without greatly expanding court facilities. It is worthy of note in
this connection that through the energetic use of pretrial procedures, including the use of impartial medical testimony, which will be alluded to
in a moment, and the application of a readiness rule, which requires as
a condition for placing a case on a trial calendar that counsel certify
that they have completed all pretrial procedures and are actually ready
for trial, the backlog of cases awaiting trial in the Supreme Court of
New York County has been reduced in the last seven years from 15,000
cases to less than 3,000 cases, and delay in reaching cases for trial has
been altogether eliminated in every type of case except personal injury
cases scheduled for jury trials, and the delay in those cases has been
reduced from four years to nineteen months.
Impartial Medical Testimony
The discussion so far indicates that improvements in the administration of justice are to be effected by the simplification rather than the
elaboration of procedures, by reducing rather than adding steps in the
judicial process. There is one innovation which can be made, however,
adding an agency or procedure, which will contribute measurably both to
improving the quality of the judicial product and to reducing expense
and delay in the process. This is the use of impartial medical testimony
in resolving the medical issues in personal injury litigation.
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As personal injury cases constitute about 80% of the litigation in
the courts of this country, and as disputes over the nature and extent of
the injuries constitute a major consideration in most personal injury
cases, ranking in importance and time consumed with the issue of liability, it is obvious that any procedure which will enhance the chance 'of
getting the right answer to the medical questions and reduce the time
normally spent on the medical inquiry will be a major contribution to the
administration of justice. Such a doubly effective procedure has been
developed and perfected. Its value has been proved in adequate experience. Its importance is so great that it is singled out for mention here
as one innovation or addition to court procedures which alone will make
a marked difference in resolving controversy, effecting dispositions, and
relieving congestion.
The procedure for employing impartial medical testimony in personal injury cases was designed to overcome the deficiencies in prevailing methods of presenting medical testimony-methods which draw out
rather than resolve controversy, confuse rather than enlighten a jury, and
fail to offer -reliable guidance to the jury in forming judgments as to
medical facts and issues. While ascertainment of the facts bearing on
liability may satisfactorily be made by lay judgments on the basis of the
common experience of a jury, the determination of medical facts calls for
special knowledge which a jury does not possess. The jury is dependent
on the aid of experts in this scientific realm. The expert testimony is
ordinarily supplied by partisan experts retained by the respective sides
to present their viewpoints. Too often these experts color their testimony, maximizing or minimizing the injuries as suits the side retaining
them. That a jury does not receive altogether trustworthy information
and reliable guidance under the purely adversary method of presenting
medical evidence through partisan experts is abundantly clear. A sample
study of cases in the Supreme Court of New York revealed that in a
quarter of the cases there were gross errors in the reading of X-rays and
that in over a quarter of the cases essential tests to warrant a diagnosis
were not made.
We may accept with a certain equanimity the controversies presented as to the facts of how an accident happened and who was to blame.
Such controversies cannot be avoided or eliminated, and can as well be
resolved by a representative body of the community as by any other
means. It is disturbing, however, indeed disgusting, to find such variations as frequently exist on the professional plane of medical testimony.
Unfortunately, there has developed a fashion of employing doctors as
well as lawyers as advocates, and the doctors retained as experts for the
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respective sides readily become medical mouthpieces. Experts are frequently sought and retained more for a cultivated art of testifying than
for basic competence and essential integrity. The jury is left without
adequate insight to determine the facts or pass upon the credibility of
the contesting experts.
The best corrective for this condition is rather apparent. It is to
bring into the medical inquiry neutral experts of unquestioned competence and honesty, doctors of the highest professional qualifications who
have no interest other than the elicitation and presentation of objective
truth. Establishing a panel of such experts who will be available at the
call of the court in those cases which present a substantial controversy
as to the nature or extent of the injuries is a proper function of a court.
It can easily and effectively be done as has been demonstrated by court
undertakings in two cities, New York and Baltimore.
The procedure is simple both in outline and operation. The initial
step and first essential is the selection of a panel of recognized authorities
in the branches of medicine which become involved in traumatic injuries.
The selection is made by the local medical societies strictly on the professional basis of highest qualifications. The doctors so selected will
be men who would eschew the role of a partisan expert and would ordinarily refuse to appear in litigation. They are almost invariably willing,
however, to respond to a call from the court as a professional and public duty.
The call upon a member of the panel is made after a pretrial conference has disclosed a sharp dispute over the medical aspects of a case,
the kind which is not likely to be resolved satisfactorily by a battle of
experts. The plaintiff is then referred to an appropriate member of the
panel, one particularly versed in the claimed injury, and after making a
thorough examination the panel doctor reports his findings to the court.
Copies of the report are also given to counsel for both sides. Then
another pretrial conference is held in which the case is considered in the
light of the independent medical report.
Experience has shown, as might be expected, that the medical controversy is usually resolved in this way and the case is settled. Many a
long, hard trial is thus saved, and the settlement made with more conviction, conscience and comfort than if the dispute were carried to a verdict.
If the case is not settled, the impartial expert remains subject to
call at the trial by either party or by the court. Of course, the parties
are still free to engage and use their own experts.
The second essential, next in importance to the manner of selecting
members of the panel, is that their compensation be paid from some in-
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dependent source or fund, or at least that they be unaware that their"compensation is connected with one party or the other. In New York, payments are made entirely from court funds provided in the regular court
budget. In Baltimore, payment is made by arrangement between the
parties or by direction of the court without the doctor knowing anything
of the arrangements.
The only other essential to thoroughly successful and satisfactory
panel procedure is that it be employed in the first instance in connection
with a pretrial conference or some similar unhurried and deliberative
process in which counsel can consider and discuss the case between themselves and with the court on a professional plane.
The Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association, having studied the operations and results of the New York
and Baltimore procedures, concluded that the introduction of impartial
medical testimony into the resolution of controversies over the medical
incidents of personal injury cases has the following wholesome and
beneficial results: (1) It improves the process of finding the medical
facts, vastly increasing the likelihood of reaching the right result.
(2) It serves to relieve court congestion by bringing about the settlement
of many cases which would otherwise have to be tried and which by
their nature would entail lengthy trials. (3) It has a prophylactic effect
upon the formulation and presentation of medical testimony in court.
(4) The modest cost involved in the payment of independent experts is
a positive economy in effecting a large saving in court operations.
In its report to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, the Judicial Section said: "The plan and procedure for establishing and employing an independent medical panel may readily be
adopted in any community where there is a volume of personal injury
litigation in the courts, and where there is a sufficient number of qualified doctors available to constitute a pool." Calling upon the Bench, Bar
and medical profession to join in a national program of fostering the
establishment of impartial medical panels in the courts in centers of
population, the members of the Judicial Section unanimously stated that:
"We can think of no single step that would be as pointed and effective a
contribution to the administration of justice as enlisting this aid in the
consideration and disposition of personal injury cases."
I am glad to say that the House of Delegates at its last meeting
adopted the report and recommendation of the Section of Judicial Administration and resolved that the recommended national program of
establishing impartial medical panels in the courts of the country be
undertaken.
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This lecture, although compacted for a single sitting, has run the
gamut of court problems and the possibilities for improving the administration of justice. The problems are obvious, the solutions almost equally
so. What has been lacking so far is the interest and will on the part of
a sufficient proportion of the profession to frame and carry out the
necessary program of reform. It took seventeen years of sustained effort to adopt the now heralded reorganization of the courts of New
Jersey. Nearly as many years have been devoted by leaders of the Bar
in Illinois to formulating a modern court system for that state and advancing it to the point where the legislature approved a plan for submission to the electorate next fall. Court reforms of significance, not touching the court structure, have been made over the past ten years by the
judiciary in New York. But the program of court reorganization framed
by the Temporary Commission on the Courts, after many years of study
and discussion, is still on dead center awaiting legislative approval.
Barnabas F. Sears, one of the leaders of the forces for court reform
in the State of Illinois, was altogether apt when he recently spoke of the
undertaking of court reform as "No Sport for the Short-Winded." Because this is so, we may have to wait for another generation, fresh in
outlook and ideas and free from accumulated prejudices, to generate the
energy and sustained effort necessary to modernize court organizations
and procedures. Because this is so, the occasion of our meeting here is
a good time and place to reflect and resolve on the subject of our courts
in relation to the needs of modern society.
The subject has been neglected in law school curricula and even
in extracurricular projects. Ancient and existing court procedures have
been studied, but little critical and constructive thinking has gone into the
study. Substantive and adjective law have been thoroughly digested, but
the courts structurally and functionally have hardly been examined, and
the administration of justice has been ignored or regarded as something
remote, of later concern perhaps but not of immediate interest.
The administration of justice must not be left as the concern only
of politicians, judges and trial specialists, most of whom are set in their
ways and feel no urge to change the status quo. The Bar generally, particularly the younger members, and law teachers and law students should
become aware of the immediacy and urgency of their vital interest in the
courts as an institution and in court procedures and professional practices.
The pace of life, the close living of a growing population, the increasing interdependence of people in economic, political and social relationships, multiplying the points of contact and friction, are bound to
create controversies and increase the demand upon society's agencies for
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the resolution and adjudication of disputes. The big question in the law
today is whether, against the inroads of administrative agencies, arbitration tribunals and compensation boards, the courts will survive as a major institution, performing the judicial function, or be further displaced
by other public or private agencies employing streamlined procedures.
Will the profession retain its traditional role in advocacy and adjudication by adapting to the dynamics of the age of automobiles, airplanes
and atomic missiles, or will it sacrifice the role by adherence to traditional methods?
Lawyers have displayed in other areas of the law a capacity for
adjustment, an adaptability to heightened demands for new and fastpaced legal services, and have thus extended the participation of the profession in an expanding economy. Only in the court area have lawyers
been content to contract, resistant to change, seemingly oblivious to the
consequence to others or themselves.
Court organization and procedures to meet the needs of modern
society are the concern of judges, practicing lawyers, law teachers and
law students. The courts as an institution, the processes of litigation
from beginning to end, the total administration of justice, call for our
urgent attention, and deserve the most thoughtful and constructive action
of which a great profession is capable.

